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Abstract
The amplification of Coronavirus risk on social media sees Vietnam falling volatile to a chaotic sphere ofmis/disinformation
and incivility, which instigates a movement to counter its effects on public anxiety and fear. Benign or malign, these civil
forces generate a huge public pressure to keep the one-party system on toes, forcing it to be unusually transparent in
responding to public concerns.
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1. Introduction
Friday, the 6th of March, 2020 was a critical turning
point in Vietnam’s battle against coronavirus. A mid-
night press conferencewas called after a residence street
in the centre of Hanoi was locked down. A few days be-
fore that, a young resident in this area returned from
London, failing to declare to airport quarantine officers
that she had been terribly unwell. She had now tested
positive and become Vietnam’s 17th Covid-19 patient.
It was a brutal blow: The country had done its best
to contain the virus from Day 1 and had seen no new
case for 24 days. Flashing back to January, when coron-
avirus started to wreak havoc in Wuhan, Vietnam’s top
leadership, disregarding all assurances from the Chinese
government, its traditional political frenemy, was quick
to take heavy-handed measures—including closing its
900-mile land border with China, ordering schools not
to reopen after the Lunar New Year, and deploying its ex-
tensive surveillance system to track and trace primary,
secondary and tertiary contacts of patients. By mid-
February, things seemed to have eased off, with the num-
ber of cases staying unchanged from the 12th onwards.
Until now.
Themidnight press conference ledmany Vietnamese
into a white night of hysteria and then days of panics.
With that came an extreme level of incivility on socialme-
dia. In the hours following the news, Patient 17 became
a target of brutal online attacks, especially on Facebook,
with a staggering amount of hate speech against her.
Unsubstantiated information about her whereabouts in
Europe before returning to Vietnam was, intentionally
or unintentionally, spread on Facebook, as were inti-
mate images and details about her seemingly prodi-
gal lifestyle and decadent personality. A Facebook page
named Patient 17 was created for people to post infor-
mation about the “rich kid” and voice anger towards her.
Some labelled her a national traitor and called for her to
be criminally prosecuted for being dishonest about her
health at the airport, which for themwas the root of this
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new saga. A few even wanted to kill her. Some of the do-
mestic media and expatriates’ news sites were quick to
join the crowd, creating a chaotic world where human
dignity—in this case, that of a hospitalized patient bat-
tling for life—was relentlessly stampeded in temper.
Incivility is nothing unfamiliar on Vietnamese social
media. A week before the above incident, Microsoft
(2020) published a Digital Civility Index report, rank-
ing Vietnam at the 21th out of 25 surveyed countries,
mainly because of the pervasive risks that its digital me-
dia pose to professional reputation, personal safety, and
health and wellbeing. Among the oft-mentioned prob-
lems are unwanted contacts, sex-related offences, hate
speech, and the spread of fake news, hoaxes, and scams.
Disrupting Vietnamese life in that context, Covid-19
seems poised to cause incidents such as the above.
This commentary will examine this social media phe-
nomenon through the theoretical lens of social amplifi-
cation of risk.
2. A Vicious Circle
The central assumption of social amplification theory
is that events pertaining to hazards ‘interact with psy-
chological, social, institutional, and cultural aspects in
ways that can heighten or attenuate public perceptions
of risk and shape risk behaviors’ (Renn, 1991, p. 287).
Social amplification happens in two stages: The risk is
first amplified during the transfer of information, trig-
gering social responses that in turn, further amplify the
risk (Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992).
As hazardous events, especially those with a close prox-
imity to a community (Costa-Font, 2020), interact with
individual psyches and socio-cultural factors—such as
the intensity of public reactions on social networks—
they create ample room for miscommunication about re-
lated risks (Busby & Onggo, 2013). Given the unforesee-
able and uncontrollable aspects surrounding hazardous
events, even minor hiccups in the process of relaying le-
gitimate, fact-based information can trigger a strong pub-
lic response and/or result in detrimental impacts on so-
ciety and the economy.
This social phenomenon manifests in the informa-
tional chaos that coronavirus creates in Vietnam’s so-
cial media. Like other outbreaks, it is associated with
a great deal of uncertainty. Ironically, as science and
other authorities know the least about the novel virus,
the public thirst for answers is at the highest point. For
Vietnamese, this was asymmetry at the extreme. The risk
is perceived to be at the doorstep since Vietnam has
strong physical, economic, and political connectionswith
China, a country that the Vietnamese public—often at
odds with its leadership’s ambivalent relationship with
its Chinese communist counterpart—holds a strong sen-
timent against. This, aided by a general lack of trust in
government transparency and confusing responses by
public authorities in the early stage of the outbreak, led
people to have nowhere to satisfy their need to know
but their own interpersonal networks. Simply put, when
rushing for answers without receiving any from author-
itative sources such as scientists, health professionals,
and government bodies, people turn to any source they
trust in daily life, even though those sources are in no
better position to know more about the disease.
Such amplification is seen in any disease outbreak,
but things would have been a little more manageable
in the past. During the H1N1 pandemic (2009–2010),
for instance, gossips about the outbreak were restricted
to smaller settings, such as a beer/coffee catch-up, a
phone chat, a community meeting, a family reunion,
or at best, the less interactive and less personal online
spaces like blogs, forums or the then nascent Facebook.
2020 was, however, different: Vietnam now had 68 mil-
lion Internet users, with 65 million being active on social
media (Hootsuite&WeAre Social, 2019). Amidst the vast
uncertainty, Facebook quickly became a main place for
Vietnamese to seek, share, and discuss news and infor-
mation about Covid-19 as a way to deal with their grow-
ing uneasiness and impatience. By allowing users to get
news and information from not only friends but “friends
of friends” or even “friends of friends of friends,” social
media create a fertile land for pandemic rumours, fake
news, hoaxes and so on—especially those appealing di-
rectly to negative emotions such as anxiety and fear—to
grow at an exponential rate.
Overall, as we have reviewed elsewhere (Nguyen,
2020), the Covid-19 infodemic on Vietnamese social me-
dia features three major types of mis/disinformation.
The first is false information and conspiracy theories
about the origin of the virus—such as that Coronavirus
is a biological weapon being leaked from a lab in Wuhan,
that Coronavirus is an attempt tomakemoney by the big
pharma, that coronavirus is an effort by the rich and pow-
erful to reduce global population growth. Most of this
was translated from foreign sources by either social me-
dia users or some gullible mainstream news outlets.
The second surrounds the development of the pan-
demic. This can take the form of deliberatemake-believe
posts—such as a translated video of a fake Wuhan
health worker claiming in January that hundreds of thou-
sands were infected with the virus, not thousands as the
Chinese government said. Sometimes, it might be just
rudimentary posts declaring something without any sup-
porting evidence—e.g., someone has died of the virus
somewhere. Such crude mis/disinformation could find
its way through the net simply because it is the daily ob-
session of a worried public.
The third is around prevention and treatment mea-
sures: While scientists are yet to understand the virus
and its working mechanisms, a plenitude of “health ad-
vice” has been posted online to teach people how to kill it
or even to treat Covid-19. The most shuddering is advice
for people to drink their own urine or bleach to prevent,
even treat, Covid-19. Less severe are the numerous posts
claiming people can stay away from Coronavirus by sun-
bathing, drinking hot water, avoiding ice creams, using
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hair driers, wearing a face mask soaked with saline solu-
tion, or eating garlic, pepper, ginger, kimchi and so on.
To be sure, some mis/disinformation has stealthy in-
tent behind it. There are, for example, the invisible hands
of hackers and state apparatuses who spread false and
malicious content about the Covid-19 to exploit public
fear for personal, commercial or political gains. In most
cases, however, it is likely that the information chaos is
down to a combination of negative emotions and lowme-
dia literacy: People, out of fear/anxiety and the lack of
news evaluation skills, unwittingly like and share wrong
or untruthful information in their genuine but hasty be-
lief that it is true. In February, soon after a woman died
at a hospital in Ho Chi Minh City, her death declaration,
personal identity, and close-up photoswere immediately
circulated on Facebook and other social platforms. The
“news” was that she died of Coronavirus. The death note,
however, specifies clearly that her death was caused
by ‘myocarditis, multiple organ dysfunction’ (quoted in
Nguyen, 2020). It was the few extra caution words af-
ter that—‘flu not excluded’—that sparked the rumour. It
was easily taken as truth by many people who, in their
sincere intention to alert others, did not pause to ques-
tion the information or read the death note.
In short, from the perspective of social amplification
theory, Covid-19 on Vietnamese social networks could
be a classic example of risk being amplified in a vicious cir-
cle of intensified and attenuated signals about itself. The
more information people seek on social media, themore
confusion many—if not most—seem to have. As confu-
sion goes that direction, it reaches a point when infor-
mation quality becomes secondary to bias confirmation.
As social messaging around Coronavirus is amplified to
deaf ears, it contributes considerably to the formation
and consolidation of anxiety and fear. Its effects can be
seen in a range of irrational behaviours in real life: stock-
piling food, queuing from 4 am to buy facemasks, abus-
ing rumoured Covid-19 cures (e.g., chloroquine), discrim-
inating people from areas with Covid-19 cases (e.g., Vinh
Phuc province), and so on.
3. The Bright Side
Not everything is bleak, however. The chaos has seen
many troubled users trying to do their bit, either as in-
dividuals or as group members, to mitigate its dreadful
impacts. A voluntary Facebook page called News Check
(Kiểm Tin) has been proactive in exposing fake Covid-19
news. By the end of April, less than five months since its
birth, the page had about 24,000 followers, having pub-
lished more than 260 posts that fact-check, cross-verify
and debunk fabricated stories or false claims on both
mainstream and social media. On YouTube, there is a
boom of clips warning people of the emerging infodemic.
Many KOLs (Key Opinion Leaders) support the fight by
voicing their views about false claims, helping bring the
“infodemic” concept into Vietnamese households. Some
doctors, epidemiologists and journalists have become es-
sential Facebook places for confused members of the
public to check for authoritative news and advice.
In the absence of systematic research, however, it
is impossible to know the extent to which such efforts
have changed the hearts and minds of a panicked pub-
lic. Like other bad news, misleading or untruthful con-
tent aroundCovid-19 sweeps through the networkwith a
much faster speed and wider reach than any correction.
Further, those with the good intention to fix things are
still a minority compared with the millions of emotion-
ally driven Facebook users. While social media compa-
nies have been proactive in cleaning their space, their
efforts seem to focus on clear fabrications, with insuffi-
cient attention to the subtle, probablymore popular type
of factually correct but substantially untrue content (e.g.,
correct facts that are “massaged” or misinterpreted dur-
ing sharing or commenting).
The amplification of Covid-19 risk through
mis/disinformation on social media, however, does seem
to have an unexpected positive effect: It creates im-
mense pressures on the one-party regime, forcing it
to go out of its usual secrecy to address public con-
cerns. After an initial period of disconcerted responses,
Vietnamese authorities realised the urgent need to unite
words and actions, sparing no effort to control the flow
of information in parallel with its extensive track-and-
trace system. There have been controversial moves—
such as a new decree that has since February led about
800 people to be heavily fined (at amounts equivalent
to three to six months of basic salaries) for spreading
mis/disinformation about Covid-19 (Reed, 2020). But,
under intensive public scrutiny, there has been an unex-
pected level of transparency and creativity. Every new
Covid-19 case, with details about their movements and
contacts, is immediately published on governmental
websites, mainstreammedia, and social media. Different
forms of media, such as outdoor posters, television trail-
ers, and even dancing performances, are used to keep
people abreast of developments aswell as to understand
the virus, its transmission and its prevention measures.
In February, Coronavirus Song (Ghen Cô Vy)—a Ministry
of Health’s edutainment clip to mobilise people to fight
the virus—went viral on YouTube (with 4.4 million views
as of April 30), made news on global news channels and
websites and has since been translated and mutated in
other countries.
As we write, Vietnam has started to return to normal
life, being internationally acclaimed for its resolute, low-
cost response to Covid-19. If this sustains as a success
throughout the rest of the pandemic, future historians
will have one sure thing to say: the strangely joined force
of the good, the bad and the ugly on Vietnam’s social me-
dia was part of that success.
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